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KAY BERRY, INC. V. TAYLOR GIFTS, INC.
421 F.3D 202 (3D CIR. 2005)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Kay Berry v. Taylor Gifts, the plaintiff, Kay Berry, Inc. ("Kay
Berry"), sued the defendants, Taylor Gifts, Inc. ("Taylor") and
Bandwagon, Inc. ("Bandwagon"), claiming that the defendants
infringed its registered copyright for rock sculptures inscribed with
poems.' In granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants,
the district court held that Kay Berry's group copyright registration
was invalid because the rock sculptures were not sufficiently
related to one another.2 Kay Berry appealed, arguing that its
copyright registration was valid under the group registration
provisions, or in the alternative, valid under the single work
registration provisions.' The appellate court reversed, holding that
regardless of whether the sculptures were sufficiently related, they
were included in a single unit of publication, and therefore could
be registered under the single work registration provisions.' The
appellate court also held that Kay Berry's rock sculpture contained
a sufficient "quantum of creativity" to qualify for copyright
protection.5 Accordingly, Kay Berry was entitled to show that the
alleged infringing work was an impermissible copy.6
1. Kay Berry, Inc. v. Taylor Gifts, Inc., 421 F.3d 202 (3d Cir. 2005).
2. Id. at 203-04.
3. Id. at 204.
4. Id. at 206.
5. Id. at 207.
6. Id.
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II. BACKGROUND
Kay Berry designed, manufactured, marketed, and sold "Garden
Accent Rocks."7 Garden Accent Rocks were decorative outdoor
sculptures resembling rocks, which were inscribed with poems.8
Kay Berry applied for copyright registration for its entire line of
Garden Accent Rocks on July 7, 1997.' Kay Berry provided its
Garden Accent Rock catalog as the required document specimen
when registering its copyright with the Copyright Office. ° Along
with identifying each sculpture by number, the catalogue contained
a photograph and description of each individual work." The
Copyright Office issued Kay Berry a Copyright Registration
Certificate for "sculptural works with design and text" with an
effective date of July 1, 1997.12
One of Kay Berry's best-selling Garden Accent Rocks was
Sculpture No. 646, a rectangular shaped sculpture resembling a
rock, with a verse inscribed on its face.' 3 The verse contained five
lines, with each word inscribed in a right-leaning font and the first
letter of each word capitalized:
If Tears Could Build A
Stairway, And Memories
A Lane, I'd Walk Right Up
To Heaven And Bring
You Home Again14
In 2003, Bandwagon supplied Taylor, and Taylor began to
market and sell, the "Memory Stone," a sculpture that was similar
to Kay Berry's Sculpture No. 646."5 Like Kay Berry's Sculpture
No. 646, the Memory Stone was a rectangular sculpture
7. Kay Berry, Inc., 421 F.3d at 202.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Kay Berry, Inc., 421 F.3d at 202.
14. Id.
15. Id.
[Vol. XVI:449450
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resembling a rock. 16 The Memory Stone was inscribed with the
same verse that was inscribed on Kay Berry's Sculpture No. 646.' 7
The Memory Stone's verse was laid out in the same five-line
format, each word beginning with a capital letter, and the entire
verse was set in a right-leaning font.18
Upon discovering the Memory Stone, Kay Berry sued Taylor
and Bandwagon for copyright infringement and moved for a
preliminary injunction prohibiting the defendants from selling the
Memory Stone.'9  On December 8, 2003, a United States
magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation suggesting
that the district court deny Kay Berry's motion for a preliminary
injunction.20 On February 23, 2004, the district court adopted the
magistrate's report and recommendation without change.2'
During Kay Berry's motion for a preliminary injunction, the
defendants filed an amended motion for summary judgment on the
infringement claim.2 On August 2, 2004, the magistrate judge
issued a report and recommendation suggesting that the district
court grant the defendants' motion.23 The magistrate's report and
recommendation concluded that: 1) Kay Berry did not have a valid
registration over its multiple works because they were not
sufficiently related; 2) Sculpture No. 646 contained no
copyrightable subject matter; and 3) Sculpture No. 646 embodied
an expression that was inseparable from an underlying idea.24 On
August 30, 2004, the district court adopted the magistrate judge's
report and recommendation as its own opinion and granted
summary judgment in favor of defendants.25 Kay Berry appealed. 6
On appeal, the appellate court disagreed with the district court's
decision and held that Kay Berry's copyright registration for
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Kay Berry, Inc., 421 F.3d at 202.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 203.
25. Kay Berry, Inc., 421 F.3d at 202-03.
26. Id. at 203.
2006]
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Sculpture No. 646 was in fact valid.27 The appellate court held that
Sculpture No. 646 was an individually recognizable element of a
single work-the copyrighted catalog of sculptures--and was
therefore entitled to the benefits of copyright registration.28 The
appellate court also held that selecting an inspirational poem from
the public domain, adapting it to make it visually and rhythmically
appealing, and casting it on its own sculptural work was
sufficiently creative to qualify for copyright protection. 29 Finally,
the appellate court held that Kay Berry's rock sculpture did not
embody an expression that was inseparable from an underlying
idea.3" Accordingly, the appellate court reversed and remanded the
case holding that Kay Berry did in fact have a valid copyright
registration and was therefore entitled to show that the defendants
infringed its copyright.3
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Validity of Kay Berry 's Copyright Registration
The appellate court began its analysis by addressing the validity
of Kay Berry's copyright registration.32 Kay Berry argued that it
properly registered Sculpture No. 646 under its Certificate of
Registration, which covered Garden Accent Rocks described as
"sculptural works with design and text."33  Along with the
Certificate of Registration, Kay Berry deposited its Garden Accent
Rocks catalog which featured pictures and descriptions of more
than one hundred sculptures, including Sculpture No. 646."4 Kay
Berry argued that the registration covered Sculpture No. 646 along
with all of the other works featured in the catalog.35 The district
27. Id. at 206.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 207.
30. Id. at 209.
31. Kay Berry, Inc., 421 F.3d at 209.
32. Id. at 203.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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court held that the individual works in the catalog were not validly
registered because they were not sufficiently "related" to each
other to qualify for group registration as required by 17 U.S.C. §
408(c)(1).36 In reversing the ruling, the appellate court held that
the district court misapplied the governing copyright registration
regulations whenevaluating Kay Berry's registration.37 When
reconsidering the validity of Kay Berry's copyright registration,
the appellate court applied the statutory provisions for both group
and single work registration.3"
1. Group Registration
Kay Berry argued that its Garden Accent Rocks were properly
registered as a group of related works pursuant to 17 U.S.C. §
408(c)(1).39 The statute states in relevant part:
The Register of Copyrights is authorized to specify
by regulation the administrative classes into which
works are to be placed for purposes of deposit and
registration, and the nature of the copies or
phonorecords to be deposited in the various classes
specified. The regulations may require or permit,
for particular classes ... a single registration for a
group of related works.4"
Relying on Behnam Jewelry Corp. v. Aron Basha Corp.,4 Kay
Berry argued that when Congress enacted § 408(c), it attempted to
liberalize the copyright laws allowing a group of works to be
registered together under a single registration, provided they were
minimally connected.42 Kay Berry further argued that under this
permissive standard, its sculptural works were sufficiently related
36. Id.
37. Kay Berry, Inc., 421 F.3d at 203.
38. Id. at 203-06.
39. Id. at 203-04.
40. Id. at 204.
41. Behnam Jewelry Corp. v. Aron Basha Corp., No. 97-Civ-3841, 1997 WL
639038 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 1997).
42. Kay Berry, Inc., 421 F.3d at 204.
2006]
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and therefore validly registered as a group of works under §
408(c) .43
Although the appellate court agreed that § 408(c) represented a
liberalization of the copyright laws, it stated that Congress did not
define the requirements of a valid copyright registration.4 The
appellate court found that the applicable subsection only stated that
"[t]he regulations may require or permit, for particular classes...
a single registration for a group of related works. '45 The appellate
court held that the statute's language does not grant to all
copyright applicants a general right to register a group of works
under a single registration.46 The appellate court concluded that
"the plain language of § 408(c)(1) merely allows the Register of
Copyrights to determine what types of works are eligible for group
registration." '47 The appellate court stated that this conclusion was
"confirmed by the more stringent language of § 408(c)(2), which
mandates the Register of Copyrights to establish regulations
permitting group registration of works appearing in periodicals. 48
The appellate court reasoned that the Register of Copyrights had
exercised the authority delegated by § 408(c)(1) by promulgating
rules that allowed group registration for "automated databases,"
"related serials," "daily newspapers," "contributions to
periodicals, .... daily newsletters," and "published photographs. 49
However, Kay Berry described its Garden Accent Rocks as
"sculptural works."5 ° Since the Register of Copyrights did not
promulgate rules that included a category for "sculptural works,"
the appellate court concluded that Kay Berry's registration was not
valid under the group registration provisions. 1
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 408(c)(1)(2005)).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Kay Berry, Inc., 421 F.3d at 204.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
454
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2. Single Work Registration
Kay Berry alternatively argued that its copyright registration
was valid as a "Single Work" under 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(3).5 2
This provision describes a single work - in the case of published
works - as "all copyrightable elements that are otherwise
recognizable as self-contained works, that are included in a single
unit of publication, and in which the copyright claimant is the
same."53  To illustrate, the appellate court referred to a typical
board game where the board, the playing pieces, and the
instructions are all individually entitled to copyright protection. 4
Since those elements are "packaged as a single unit (the game
itself), it is appropriate to allow the copyright owner to register the
entire game, and protect the individual elements through that
single registration." 5  Kay Berry claimed that its copyright
registration covered its catalog deposit, and that Sculpture No. 646
is an individually recognizable element of that single work.5
6
The appellate court stated that the "Single Work" registration is
separate and distinct from "Group Registration."57  It explained
that "the group registration provisions were enacted pursuant to 17
U.S.C. § 408(c)(1), and were based on Congress's desire to
liberalize the registration process."58 The appellate court stated
that the single work registration provision, by contrast, was
promulgated pursuant to the language of 17 U.S.C. § 408(a),
which states that "the owner of copyright or of any exclusive right
in the work may obtain registration of the copyright claim . .. .""
This provision codified the already existing Copyright Office
practice of allowing copyright owners to register multiple works
published together as a single work for a single fee.6° When this
provision was established, the Copyright Office had reserved for
52. Id.
53. Id. (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(3)(i)(A)(2005)).
54. Kay Berry, Inc., 421 F.3d at 205.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Kay Berry, Inc., 421 F.3d at 205.
2006] 455
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implementation in a separate proceeding the possibility of
providing for "a single registration for a group of 'relatedworks'
under § 408(c)(1)."6'
The appellate court stated that "the single work registration
regulation is distinct from the group registration regulation and has
different qualifying requirements."62 The court explained that the
single work registration regulation was silent on whether the
individual, self-contained elements of the "single work" be
"related" in order to be registered.63  Instead, "single work
registration requires, in the case of published works, that all of the
self-contained works be 'included in a single unit of publication'
and share the same copyright claimant.
6 4
Referring to Benham Jewelry, the appellate court stated that the
district court confused the requirements of single work registration
and group registration.65  The district court had erroneously
concluded that the single work regulation was promulgated
pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 408(c) rather than 408(a).66 The district
court also failed to recognize the distinct regulatory requirements
for single work registration and group registration.6 7 The appellate
court pointed out that although Benham Jewelry quoted the single
work registration regulation - including its requirement of a single
unit of publication - the district court repeatedly mentionedand
discussed the requirements for "single registration for multiple
related works" or group registration.68 The Benham Jewelry court
"improperly melded the 'single unit of publication' requirement of
single work registration and the 'relatedness' requirement of group
registration."69 As a result, the Benham Jewelry court concluded
that "the 'single unit of publication' requirement was superfluous
61. Id. (citing Registration of Claims to Copyright, 43 Fed. Reg. 965, 966
(Jan. 5, 1978) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 202)).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. KayBerry, Inc., 421 F.3d at 205.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 206.
456
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where the works at issue were sufficiently related."7  The
appellate court held this conclusion to be erroneous because
"relatedness" is not a requirement for single work registration.7'
Accordingly, the appellate court held that the single work
registration regulation arises from a different statutory provision
than group work registration and therefore it was improper for the
Benham Jewelry court to ignore the single unit of publication
requirement.7"
In addition, the appellate court referred to Donald Bruce & Co.
v. B.N. Multi Corn Corp.,73 in whichthe court made a similar
analytical error.74 In Donald Bruce, the court stated that the group
registration provision for "single registration for a group of related
works" was at issue rather than the provision for a single work.75
However, during its discussion of the relatedness requirement of
group registration, the court in Donald Bruce considered whether
including otherwise unrelated works in a "single unit of
publication" might satisfy the relatedness requirement for group
registration. 76 The Donald Bruce court stated that this meant items
in a single unit of publication might serve as a proxy for
relatedness and therefore "improperly meld the group registration
and single work registration requirements.
77
The appellate court concluded that both the Benham Jewelry and
Donald Bruce courts failed to account for the fundamental
distinction between single work registration under 37 C.F.R. §
202.3(b)(3) and group registration under 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(4).8
Accordingly, the appellate court concluded that although Kay
Berry's Garden Accent Rocks may not be sufficiently "related,"
they were entitled to single work registration because they were
included in a single unit of publication and the copyright
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Kay Berry, Inc., 421 F.3d at 206.
73. Donald Bruce & Co. v. B.N. Multi Corn Corp., 964 F. Supp. 265 (N.D.
Ill. 1997).
74. Kay Berry, Inc., 421 F.3d at 206.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
2006] 457
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claimantof the works was the same.79
B. Sculpture No. 646 Was Entitled to Copyright Protection
The appellate court also reversed the district court's finding that
Sculpture No. 646 lacked any protectable configuration or
design.8" The appellate court stated that a sculptural work's
creativity derives from the combination of texture, color, size, and
shape, as well as the particular verse inscribed and the way the
verse is presented.8 It explained that it was irrelevant that these
elements may not be individually entitled to protection.82 The
court referred to elemental raw materials like colors, letters,
descriptive facts, and earlier works of art that, due to the passage
of time, are no longer copyright protected.83 The court explained
that when "an author combines these elements and adds his or her
own imaginative spark, creation occurs, and the author is entitled
to protection for the result. 84 The court concluded that selecting
an inspirational poem from the public domain, adapting that poem
to make it visually and rhythmically appealing, and then casting it
on its own sculptural work, was a sufficient quantum of creativity
to qualify for copyright protection.
C. Kay Berry 's Copyright Registration Did Not Extend to an Idea
The appellate court next turned to the second part of the
infringement inquiry, whether the defendants improperly copied
Sculpture No. 646 and whether the expression Kay Berry sought to
protect had merged with an unprotectable idea.86 The court
explained that "copying refers to the act of infringing any of the
exclusive rights that accrue to the owner of a valid copyright as set
79. Id.
80. Kay Berry, Inc., 421 F.3d at 207.
81. Id.
82. Id. (citing Tufenkian Import/Export Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy,
Inc., 338 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2003)).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Kay Berry, Inc., 421 F.3d at 207.
86. Id.
458
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forth at 17 U.S.C. § 106. '1 7 These rights included "the right to
distribute and reproduce copyrighted material."88  The appellate
court explained that two elements must be shown to prove
infringement: 1) the defendant had access to the copyrighted work;
and 2) the original and allegedly infringing work shared substantial
similarities.89
The appellate court explained that "substantial similarity," in
turn, is further broken down into two considerations: 1) whether
the defendant copied from the plaintiff's work; and 2) whether the
copying, if proven, went so far as to constitute an improper
appropriation.9" A showing of substantial similarity, "coupled with
evidence that the infringing author had access to the original work,
permits a fact-finder to infer that the infringing work is not itself
original, but instead an impermissible copy of the original."'"
The appellate court explained that a fundamental premise of
copyright law allows an author to protect only the expression of an
idea, but not the idea itself.9 2 Thus, "an author may base his work
on the same inspiration as that of an earlier work, but he may not
'copy the copy."' When determining whether two works are
substantially similar, "a fact-finder must determine whether the
later work is similar because it appropriates the unique expressions
of the original author, or merely because it contains elements that
would be expected when two works express the same idea or
explore the same theme."94  "Because an author can only
demonstrate substantial similarity by referencing those aspects of
his work that embody his creative contribution, he will have a
more difficult time proving infringement if his work contains only
a minimal amount of original expression."95 The appellate court
87. Id.
88. Id. (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 930 F.2d 277
(3d Cir. 1991)).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 208 (citing Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elecs.
Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1982)).
91. Kay Berry, Inc., 421 F.3d 208.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id..
95. Id.
2006]
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further stated that in someinstances, there might come a point
when an author's expression becomes indistinguishable from the
idea he seeks to convey, thus merging the two.9 6  "In these
circumstances, no protection is available for the expression;
otherwise, the copyright owner could effectively acquire a
monopoly on the underlying art or the idea itself."9'
However, the appellate court held that in the present case the
protectable originality of the allegedly infringed work was to be
found, if at all, solely in its appearance.98 Kay Berry claimed that
the defendants infringed its copyright not by using the same public
domain poem or inscribing a rock with text, but by copying the
specific combination of elements it employed to give Sculpture
No. 646 its unique look.99 The appellate court held that although
there was a high evidentiary burden upon Kay Berry, it was in fact
entitled to the opportunity to demonstratethat the Memory Stone
was neither a unique creation nor the unavoidable expression of a
common idea, but rather an impermissible copy.' 0
IV. CONCLUSION
The appellate court reversed the district court's finding and
stated that, regardless of whether Kay Berry's sculptures were
sufficiently related; they were included in a single unit of
publication. 0 ' Therefore, the sculptures could be registered under
the single work registration regulation.0 2  Furthermore, the
appellate court concluded that Kay Berry's sculpture was in fact
entitled to copyright protection because it was not an avoidable
expression of an idea.0 3  Accordingly, the appellate court
remanded the case to allow Kay Berry to prove that the defendants
impermissibly copied its sculpture.0 4
96. Id. at 209.
97. Kay Berry, Inc., 421 F.3d at 209.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 205
102. Id.
103. Kay Berry, Inc., 421 F.3d at 207.
104. Id.
460
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